Introduction
International travel has become cheaper and more accessible resulting in increased travel. This has resulted in rapid spread of pathogens within and across international borders [1, 2] . International travel poses a risk to transfusion safety, from travellers or immigrants who may donate blood resulting in a transfusion-transmissible infection (TTI). Risk of TTIs is low within many developed countries [3] ; however, international travel to areas with outbreaks of infectious pathogens may pose a threat [4, 5] . There are several arboviruses including dengue viruses (DENV), chikungunya virus (CHIKV) and Zika virus (ZIKV) that are currently particularly relevant to transfusion safety globally [6] [7] [8] .
Large numbers of Australians travel internationally, with 9 million residents departing for short-term travel in the 12 months from July 2013 to June 2014 [9] . The most popular short-term travel destinations in 2013 were New Zealand, Indonesia, United States of America, Thailand, United Kingdom, China, Singapore and Fiji [9] . Several of these countries, including Indonesia, Thailand and Fiji, are endemic for ZIKV, CHIKV and/or DENV and outbreaks occur [10] [11] [12] . Thus, the impact of travel-related deferrals is particularly relevant for the Australian Red Cross Blood Service (Blood Service) and the safety of the Australian blood supply.
There are a range of protective measures used by blood services to prevent TTIs after travel. Depending on the risk profile of the pathogen, these may include excluding the donor, or restricting the manufacture of specific components. The Blood Service aims to prevent transfusiontransmission (TT) using donor selection coupled with donor restriction and/or exclusion, as well as sensitive laboratory screening for selected TTIs. However, suitable tests may not be available or cost-effective for some emerging infectious pathogens. Donors in Australia are required to complete a donor questionnaire and a confidential interview, where a thorough medical, lifestyle and travel history is elicited [13] . Donors can then be temporarily or permanently restricted or deferred according to Blood Service protocols. At the time of writing, in Australia as per the Blood Service's 'Guidelines for Selection of Blood Donors', temporary travel-related deferrals exist for donors who have recently visited 160 countries/ areas in which DENV, malaria, Ebola/Marburg virus, CHIKV, West Nile virus (WNV) and ZIKV are endemic, to minimize the risk of TT. These deferrals involve restricting donations either entirely or to source plasma for a period of time, ranging from 4 weeks to 3 years depending on the pathogenic agent. The restriction to source plasma is only for agents that have been demonstrated to be efficiently inactivated by the reduction and filtration steps involved in the fractionation process, such as DENV [14] .
Donor travel risk assessment is relevant for blood services globally. The benefits of deferring Dutch donors after travelling internationally to areas experiencing disease outbreaks have previously been explored [15] . The European Up-Front Risk Assessment Tool (EUFRAT) (available from http://eufrattool.ecdc.eu ropa.eu/) has since been developed to quantify this risk of emerging infectious disease outbreaks on blood transfusion safety [16, 17] . This model has been used to assess the TT risk of Q fever during outbreaks in the Netherlands during 2007 to 2009 [18] , and also to estimate the risk from Dutch donors travelling to regions experiencing DENV transmission (Suriname, Aruba, Curacao, Saint Maarten, Bonaire, Saint Eustatius and Sabac) [19] .
To date, no published studies have quantitated the risk to the safety of the Australian blood supply of emerging infectious pathogens in Australian donors travelling overseas. As Australians tend to travel to countries in the Asia-Pacific region [9, 20] , many of which experience arboviral outbreaks in addition to endemic transmission [10] [11] [12] , it is important to specifically evaluate the threat to Australian blood safety from blood donors travelling overseas. This study applied the EUFRAT model to estimate the risk from Australian donors acquiring potential TTIs through international travel to areas affected by emerging infectious diseases. Although outbreaks of DENV occur in the north-east of Australia [21] , assessing the risk from domestic travel during such outbreaks was not included in this study.
Materials and methods

Australian travel data
Overseas arrival and departure data for the 12 months from July 2013 to June 2014 were obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) [9] and adjusted if necessary to estimate the proportion visiting the specific area as opposed to the entire country. Data sets corresponding to the specific time frames of the outbreaks studied were used. The estimations are based on the following Australian visiting traveller data in the specified time period: 150 000 to Fiji, 260 000 to Bali, 121 000 to Phuket, 4200 to French Polynesia and 950 000 to Indonesia. The average length of stay overseas for donors was extracted from the Blood Service donor travel survey, which is undertaken on a semi-regular basis to understand the travel habits of Australian donors. This survey was performed in late 2014 covering travel in the preceding 6 months (January-June, 2014) for 10 595 responding donors.
Selection of study areas
Outbreaks of relevant TTIs in the preceding 3 years were reviewed and areas for study were selected based on travel data regarding Australian donors and other Australian travellers, proximity to Australia and data availability. Outbreaks of arboviruses in five areas were selected for inclusion in this study: DENV in Fiji 2014 [10] , DENV in Bali 2013 [11] , DENV in Phuket 2013 [12] , ZIKV in French Polynesia 2013-2014 [22] and CHIKV in Indonesia 2013 [11] .
Australian blood donation data
The number of donations collected and resultant components issued during 2013 and 2014 were obtained from Blood Service databases (Table 1 ). The specific components included were as follows: fresh frozen plasma, platelets (pooled buffy coat-and apheresis-derived) and red blood cells.
Application of model
The EUFRAT model (version 2Á2Á31) was adapted and applied to estimate the number of Australian donors potentially infected while overseas. This model is an online tool designed to assess and quantify the TT risk of an emerging infectious disease during an ongoing outbreak period and has been used in a number of published studies (for more information on the model and its function, please see http://eufrattool.ecdc.europa.eu/) [16] [17] [18] [19] 23] . Similar to other models that estimate TT risk, none of the parameters are specific to the Netherlands such that when local data are used, the validity of the model would not be expected to decrease. Some of the prepopulated parameters for certain diseases were modified based on the literature, for example the duration of infectivity of acute infection (viraemia; preset as 5 days for DENV) was increased to 9.1 based on the literature [24] . Other modifications used input parameters, obtained from the literature as well as online materials, as outlined in Table 2 [27] . (7) CHIKV is transfusion-transmitted.
Comparing risk predictions using surveillance methods
Australia has a national surveillance system of more than 50 communicable diseases or disease groups, including DENV, CHIKV and ZIKV (additional information available from: http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing. nsf/Content/cda-surveil-nndss-nndssintro.htm). National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System data on DENV, CHIKV and ZIKV were provided by the Office of Health Protection, Department of Health, on behalf of the Communicable Diseases Network Australia. The numbers of cases of each disease, during the relevant time frame and This is the number of buffy coat-derived platelet components issued. As each unit is pooled from the buffy coat of four individual donors, the numbers presented in the table were multiplied by 4 when entered in the EUFRAT model. n/a n/a n/a n/a 0 [27] Donor screening Proportion of symptomatic acute infections 63% [7] 63% [7] 63% [7] 20% [46] 90% [27] Effectiveness of donor health questionnaire 70 70 70 70 83Á7 [27] Blood component production and donor exposure settings Donor exposure (see Table 1 from the relevant country, were extracted (Table 3) . These data were used as the population exposure in the EUFRAT model, instead of estimated donor visitors, with donors assumed to have the same incidence as the general Australian population. Australian populations estimates were obtained from the ABS for 2013 [28] and 2014 [29] (Table 3) .
Comparing traveller data to notification data
The outputs using the two methods are not directly comparable as the differences in risk result, in part, from the EUFRAT model appropriately adjusting for the proportion of infectivity that occurs overseas in traveller data. For example with the traveller data, EUFRAT model correctly assumes that a proportion of the duration of viraemia (9Á1 days average for dengue) occurs when the donor is overseas (average stay 16 days). In the notification data method, that assumption is not used and therefore 100% of infectivity is assumed to be a TT risk. This results in an overestimate of the number of infected components (and therefore risk) using notification data when compared to traveller data. For illustrative purposes, if the latent period for traveler data is increased to a duration where 100% of the infectivity occurs when the donor returns (>16 days, an incorrect assumption), then the risk increases, for example the 152 infected donors in Fiji would result in 2Á25 infected components and the risk increases to 1 in 405 846. To illustrate a number that is directly comparable, the number of infected donors in each scenario is presented (Table 4 ).
Ethical approval
This study was conducted under approval from the Blood Service Human Research Ethics Committee and the University of Queensland School of Medicine Low Risk Ethics Review Panel.
Results
For travel to Fiji during a DENV outbreak, the model yielded an estimated 0Á64 infected components that could cause TT-DENV in a year based on traveller data. This was considerably more than the estimated 0Á04 TT-DENVinfected components estimated using notification data (Table 4) . Travel to Bali, Indonesia, and Phuket, Thailand, during DENV outbreaks resulted in lower estimates of 0Á03 and 0Á04, respectively. In contrast to Fiji, notification data estimated the risk from the entire countries of Indonesia and Thailand (as opposed to Bali/Phuket) to be considerably higher at 0Á34 and 0Á09 TT-DENV-infected components. For travel to French Polynesia during a Unknown, but assumed to be 1%, however, given the risk is concentrated in Far North Queensland and dengue fever should be considered as a differential diagnosis in severe dengue infection, the rate of severe dengue is likely to be far lower than this estimate.
ZIKV outbreak, we estimated 0Á04 potentially infected components. For travel to Indonesia during a CHIKV outbreak, the estimated infected components from traveler data was 1Á5 9 10 -3 . Although CHIKV notification data from Indonesia documented a very low risk of 0Á04 infected components released, this was greater than 25 times the estimate from traveller data. Estimates of severe infection in transfusion recipients (Table 4) were extremely low for all scenarios modelled.
Discussion
With the popularity and accessibility of overseas travel, there is a growing risk of global infectious pathogen spread, including importation into unaffected regions. Air travel can result in the spread of an infectious agent between major cities within a day, and sometimes within a few hours [30] , as evidenced by the spread of WNV and the recent spread of ZIKV into the Americas [31] . In this study, we applied the EUFRAT model to the Australian setting using two methods:
(1) overseas outbreak information and estimating donor visits and (2) using Australian notification data to provide an Australian incidence from the outbreak region. CHIKV, DENV and ZIKV are becoming increasingly prevalent globally. Blood services must evaluate the risks involved with the increasing prevalence of emerging infectious pathogens internationally. This study yielded a large spectrum of risk levels for the infectious pathogens studied. Without current travel restrictions, the risk of infected blood components causing TTIs for selected infectious agents in Australian donors returning from overseas travel was very low, and the risk of severe complications or death in a transfusion recipient was even lower. These estimates are comparable with those obtained using the EUFRAT model by Oei et al. (2016) for the risk of severe complications in Dutch travellers [19] , and Lieshout-Krikke et al. (2016) for Dutch donors returning from WNV areas in Europe [32] . However, there was considerable variation in risk estimates dependent on the method used, which highlights the uncertainty in relying on modelled estimates to make blood safety decisions.
Current Blood Service policy mandates restrictions after donor travel to study areas. Donors who had travelled to Fiji and French Polynesia are restricted to plasma only for fractionation for 4 weeks after leaving the area due to DENV or CHIKV risk, while donors returning from Indonesia and Thailand have similar restrictions applied for 4 months due to malaria risk precautions. Plasma for fractionation is allowable as the fractionation process includes pathogen reduction and filtration steps, shown Based on number of departures from Australia to the specified country during the defined time frame as per the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) [9] .
to be effective for a number of pathogens including arboviruses [14] . Travel to Fiji during the 2014 DENV outbreak resulted in the largest risk (although still small) using local outbreak and Australian travel data, due to the high infection rate there. However, the Fiji outbreak data reported suspected, rather than confirmed, cases and therefore EUFRAT adjustments for undetected cases (95%) likely significantly overestimated the risk, as this resulted in an estimated 60 000 cases per 100 000. Although notification data in Australia have limitations, further discussed below, the outbreak risk may be somewhere in between the two Fiji estimates based on local outbreak or Australian travel data, but is dependent on the many other input variables with considerable uncertainty that influence TT. Unlike Fiji, the low risk to blood safety predicted for the DENV outbreaks in Bali and Phuket using outbreak data in the country of origin is likely a considerable underestimate of the actual number of infections in these regions. In particular, while not unique to resource-poor settings, modelling using case data or outbreak reports in these countries is sensitive to the ability of the surveillance system to determine accurate case data. A cohort study in Indonesian adults found an observed incidence rate during a study period of symptomatic dengue was 43 times higher than the reported national or provincial rates during the same time period [33] . In addition, this study found a symptomatic-toasymptomatic ratio of 1:2Á6. Even using the undetected cases proportion of 95% for DENV, considering these Note the asymptomatic estimates for foreign outbreaks and notification data differ as demonstrated in Table 2 and Table 3 . The differences in risk result in part from the model adjusting for the proportion of infectivity that occurs overseas in traveler data and therefore is not at risk.
figures, this is likely to be only a proportion of the true burden. The considerably lower estimates from using overseas outbreak data demonstrate the limitations of using such data to model risk in blood donors. Although there were a large number of cases of CHIKV reported in Indonesia, the model predicted a relatively low number of infected products from donor travel. This is likely an underestimate because area-specific data were not used and Indonesia has a very large population (249 865 631). The local incidence, and therefore the donor incidence, was calculated to be very low. CHIKV would be expected to be subject to the same underreporting as DENV. The ZIKV outbreak in French Polynesia resulted in a small risk, due to the relatively small number of Australians that travel to this country.
Estimates based on notification data were different to those calculated using foreign outbreak/traveller-specific data. The most notable difference was for DENV infections from Indonesia, which resulted in higher risk than the foreign outbreak/traveller data-based estimate. There are a number of reasons for these discrepancies. Firstly, surveillance data only record the country an infection originated from, not the specific area. Therefore, it is very difficult to compare modelled data for Bali and Phuket as it is impossible to determine the proportion of infections that came from the specific area that was modelled. However, given the majority of Australian travellers to Indonesia travel to Bali, Bali likely accounts for the majority of the notification data risk, as has been demonstrated for travellers from the state of Western Australia, where more than 80% of cases acquired in Indonesia were acquired in Bali between 2010 and 2012 [34] . The EUFRAT model adjusts for undetected infection. However, the Australian notification data for these infections are subject to underestimation similar to most surveillance systems that rely on an unwell person attending health care and having a blood test taken that can accurately diagnose the disease that meets the case definition [35] . Therefore, the modelled risks using Australian notification data are almost certainly an underestimate of the true risk of the outbreak parameter input, demonstrating the uncertainty of the estimates and the generally proportionately larger underestimation of the risk of the outbreak using disease in-country incidence rates.
In addition to the issues with foreign outbreak/traveller data discussed above, this study has several additional limitations. Foremost among them being that all models are sensitive to the accuracy of underpinning assumptions, of which there are a number in this analysis, which have been previously discussed specifically for this model [36] . For data availability reasons, it was assumed Australian donors' travel habits are similar to international and Australian tourists. In order to explore this assumption, the results from a survey of donors on the subject of travel were analysed. The survey results were not sufficient to be used in place of travel data obtained from the ABS, however, provided insight into their similarity. Finally, the relatively small proportion of TT-arboviral cases in the context of large ongoing outbreaks suggests that transmission by vector is substantially more efficient than blood TT [37, 38] . This suboptimal transmission efficiency tends to overestimate the risk associated with viraemic donors, and accordingly, this needs to be considered when interpreting the modelled TT risk estimates.
The risks to blood safety estimated herein are very low. However, as discussed, if other parameters are assumed to be reasonable estimates (this is a big 'if', given the uncertainties in TT knowledge), our outbreak model inputs may underestimate this risk. In addition, given that many of these arboviruses share similar vectors, there are clear areas of higher risk for multiple arboviral infections. This has been demonstrated with ZIKV in Australia where the Blood Service has not to date had to introduce any ZIKVspecific travel deferrals, as all ZIKV risk areas are already covered by existing deferrals. Given arboviral transmission tends to occur in these common areas, the potential impact of arboviruses on blood safety should not be considered separately, which may increase the overall risk above an acceptable level. An alternative approach for managing risk could be the process of a universal deferral for a prespecified time frame following travel, rather than targeted deferral following travel to specific countries; such an approach has been implemented in Belgium and the Netherlands, where donors are universally deferred for 28 days following travel outside of Europe [39] . Another alternative could be risk area subdivision, where deferrals and restrictions are placed only after travel to specific high-risk areas within risk countries, which could result in a smaller impact on blood component supply sufficiency. However, such an approach relies on accurate overseas travel data, which may not always be available. Such a policy already exists at the Blood Service for donors travelling to, or residing in areas with local DENV outbreaks, and we have previously assessed this as an effective approach given Australia's increasing demand for plasma products. Pathogen inactivation (PI) represents yet another alternative, which may reduce the need for donor deferral. Some systems have been shown to effectively inactivate arboviruses in platelets and plasma [40, 41] . However, changes in component quality resulting in potential loss of product efficacy may occur with some technologies, and PI is not currently available for whole blood or red blood cells [42] . Nonetheless, development of these technologies provides a potential future adjunct and/or alternative to donor deferral and donation screening.
As far as we are aware, this is the first study in Australia to estimate TT risk from blood donors travelling internationally to areas affected by emerging infectious pathogens, which has relevance for the role of travelrelated donor deferrals as a risk mitigation strategy. The predicted risk of infection in blood components manufactured from blood donors travelling overseas to the areas studied was relatively low, with the possibility of severe consequences or death in a transfusion recipient even smaller. Nonetheless, the current strategy of restricting donors returning from outbreak areas to source plasma provides a simple and effective method to attain a risk as low as reasonably achievable, in view of the uncertainties of the modelled estimates and the multiple infectious pathogen risks that may arise from one area, as demonstrated by ZIKV.
